

authorization. But if the United Nations cannot, or will not, act, then this Congress must consider the benefits of unilateral action under a second resolution using expedited procedures.

The Spratt resolution does not tie the President's hands. U.S. national security will be protected. This resolution sends a strong message to Iraq that the Congress insists that it comply with its obligations.

It also sends a strong message to the United Nations and to our friends and to our allies all around the world that we are committed to acting with them to the greatest extent possible to meet this threat. In these ways, the Spratt substitute improves the resolution already before us.

I urge my colleagues to vote with me to support it.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BLUNT).

Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise with some concern in my opposition to this resolution, because I have such high regard for my friend, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. SKELTON), who just spoke in favor of the resolution. But I have read the resolution carefully, and I think this is a step backward in all of our actions. It really restricts, rather than broadens, the use of force against Iraq that already is authorized under current law.

Section 3 is even narrower than Public Law 102-1, which already authorizes the United States to use force to restore international peace and security. We are already authorized to stop Iraq from supporting terrorism. We are already authorized to prevent Iraq from threatening its neighbors. We have already authorized the United States to protect Iraq's own civilian population.

I believe you can read this resolution clearly. All of those things would no longer be authorized. I think you cannot even continue to enforce the no-fly zone under this resolution.

Section 3 would require the United States to wait for the United Nations Security Council to act before the President could take action to protect our national security interests against the dangers of weapons of mass destruction posed by Iraq. Even the United Nations Security Council approval of section 3 would not authorize the United States to act. We would have to have United Nations action, and then we would have to have a second vote in this Congress.

The vote in the Congress is restricted by the substitute.

This is a step backward. It sends a muddy signal about our resolve. It completely replaces the Gephardt-Hastert resolution that is before us, and really postpones a critical question to another day.

We have put this question off too long already. This resolution asks us to put it off yet longer. I encourage my colleagues to join me in rejecting this

Spratt substitute resolution and moving forward to pass the Hastert-Gephardt resolution later today.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. PASTOR).

(Mr. PASTOR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PASTOR. Mr. Speaker, I support the Spratt amendment because I believe that we should not rush into war without seeking the support of our allies. We should not send American troops into combat before making a good-faith effort to put U.N. inspectors back into Iraq under a more forceful resolution. We should not turn to a policy of preemptive attack without first providing a limited time option for peaceful resolution of the threat.

This amendment would authorize the use of U.S. forces in support of a new U.N. resolution mandating the elimination by force, if necessary, of all Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. If the Security Council does not pass such a resolution, the amendment calls on the President to then seek authorization for unilateral military action.

The Spratt amendment demonstrates our preference for a peaceful solution and coalition support without ruling out unilateral military force if it becomes necessary.

America has long stood behind the principle of exhausting diplomacy before resorting to war, and at times like this, we must lead by example.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. LANTOS).

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the chairman of the Committee on International Relations for yielding me time.

First, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my good friend from South Carolina (Mr. SPRATT), one of the most valued of this House, on a very thoughtful and creative amendment. I believe, however, that the amendment would weaken the hand of our Secretary of State in international negotiations that are occurring as we speak.

Every Member of this body prefers a diplomatic and peaceful solution. Every Member of this body prefers to have as many nations, friends, allies and others come with us as possible. But to enhance the prospects for a peaceful solution, both the Security Council and Saddam Hussein must perceive that diplomatic failure will lead to military action. This amendment fails to convey that critical message.

Mr. Speaker, the Spratt amendment requires the President to certify "that the use of military force against Iraq will not impair international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." This amendment effectively asks the President of the United States to certify the unknowable.

The initial impact of action in Iraq on international cooperation is uncertain. It may be argued that it will di-

minish it or it will enhance it. But one thing we are all certain of: Once Iraq is disarmed, international cooperation against terrorism will skyrocket, and international terrorism itself will have been dealt a severe blow.

While the principles behind the amendment and the underlying text have some similarities, I must oppose the amendment, Mr. Speaker, because I believe at this stage we must support the bipartisan-bicameral agreement reached with the White House.

I strongly urge my colleagues to reject this well-intentioned amendment. It would unravel the agreement which is on the verge of ratification, and it would undermine our goal of speaking with a strong and united voice.

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. NADLER).

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time.

Mr. Speaker, the Spratt resolution would permit the use of military force, but only to eliminate the real danger we face, Iraq's possession of nuclear or chemical or biological weapons. The President's resolution would allow the administration to use military force to seek regime change in Iraq, a very dangerous course of action.

It is one thing to say to Saddam Hussein, we are going to disarm you of your weapons of mass destruction. It is another thing to say, we are going to kill you, which is what regime change means. Faced with that threat, with that assurance, there would be nothing to deter Saddam Hussein from deciding, like Sampson in the Philistine temple, that he might as well pull down the world around him. Why should he not go down in history as an Arab hero by attacking Israel with chemical or biological weapons? Israel may then feel well to retaliate, and no one can calculate the course of escalation from there.

Just the other day the Director of the CIA, George Tenet, warned the Senate that "if Saddam Hussein concluded the survival of his regime were threatened, he probably would become much less constrained in adopting terrorist action."

The Spratt substitute is the most effective way to go about disarming Saddam Hussein, while avoiding tactics that could very well end up in regional conflagration. It grants more limited, but still sufficient, power to the administration to meet the threat posed by Iraq's weapons program. It allows for the President to use force in conjunction with the U.N. if it becomes necessary.

It does not, however, grant the President a blank check, on the model of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, as the main resolution before us does.

I am proud to support this resolution. It maximizes the chances we will disarm Saddam Hussein and eliminate the real danger, without getting into a major conflagration.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. OXLEY).